an emergency session of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) opened in Hanoi. The session, known as the Ninth Plenum, was held, in part, to determine the best route forward for the party following the coup that had toppled Ngo Dinh Diem's South Vietnamese government three weeks before. Over the ensuing weeks, the committee members addressed domestic and international concerns of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), particularly the evolving political situation in the South and the status of the world revolutionary struggle. At the heart of the matter were divisions within the party over the best means to achieve the reunification of Vietnam and the ramifications that the widening Sino-Soviet split might have on this goal. From what can be gleaned from the spotty historical record, the debates were quite contentious.
He believed that its focus on building socialism in North Vietnam, rather than militarily supporting the mounting insurgency in the South, was unlikely to precipitate a crisis below the seventeenth parallel that might prompt an American military intervention and the concomitant threat to world peace. The militant "South-first" wing of the party found support for its position in the People's Republic of China, which was by this point vehemently attacking the so-called right-wing revisionism of the USSR and its policy of peaceful coexistence, which, Beijing contended, encouraged rather than resisted American imperialism.
The Hanoi government feared that a failure to resolve these disputes would compromise the party's unity of purpose, leading to confusion throughout the North Vietnamese populace, loss of confidence among the southern revolutionaries, and the rupturing of relations with either, or both, Moscow and Beijing. In the end, this extraordinary session of the Central Committee produced a resolution, subsequently called Resolution 9, that committed the DRV militarily to reunification with the South, even though doing so risked war with Saigon's principle ally, the United States. This new course of action would require decisive leadership, so Resolution 9 also called for the purge of any party leaders or officials who failed to adhere to this new line. This was a clear victory for the militant wing of the Vietnam Workers' Party and its leader, Le Duan, who would seize this opportunity to eliminate his enemies, consolidate his power, and commit the North irrevocably on a path to war with the United States.
This episode bridges two excellent new works on the Vietnam War, exemplifying their contribution to the expansive literature on the conflict and highlighting some current trends in recent scholarship. Pierre Asselin 's Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954 -1965 and Lien-national archives, consider the perspectives of all sides in the conflict, and place the events of their respective narratives into a broader global context. In this way, they go beyond the standard Cold War paradigm that has been the hallmark of the bulk of the literature on the Vietnam War to consider how the other international force to affect global politics in the second half of the twentieth century-decolonization-influenced events on the Indochinese peninsula.
To begin, both Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War and Hanoi's War continue the trend in the past decade and a half of Vietnam War scholarship of taking advantage of the gradual opening of Vietnamese archives to scholars for the purpose of exploring "the other side" of the war (Asselin, 1; Nguyen, 2). Since the 1990s, scholars with the proper language skills, like Asselin and Nguyen, have been able to use Vietnamese-language sources to provide agency to the Vietnamese actors on both sides of the seventeenth parallel and challenge long-standing Western assumptions about the war in Vietnam (Bradley and Brigham 1993; Masur and Miller 2006) . Both scholars draw heavily from Vietnamese Archives Number 3 in Hanoi, which houses the files of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam . Both supplement their findings with documents from archival collections in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, while Asselin also consults the holdings of Canadian archives and Nguyen employs material from Vietnamese Archives Number 2 in Ho Chi Minh City-which holds documents from the Republic of (South) Vietnam -and the Hungarian national archives. (Nguyen also provides a particularly useful "guide" to these collections for the "reader and researcher" [11] [12] [13] [14] .)
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Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 10 (March 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-10) Using these sources, both authors demonstrate that the North Vietnamese were "anything but puppets or passive players" in the war, neither simply reacting to American escalation nor mindlessly following the lead of Moscow or Beijing (the quote is from Nguyen, 312; see also Asselin, 2). Instead, Asselin suggests that the Politburo in Hanoi bears as much responsibility as the Johnson administration for the escalation to war in South Vietnam (3), while Nguyen contends that policy makers in Washington were "often… at the mercy of actors in Hanoi and Saigon who had their own geostrategic reasons to extend the fighting and to frustrate the peace negotiations" (9). As for Hanoi's relationship with Moscow and Beijing, both authors show that the Politburo was adept at using both of its allies to maximize its freedom to maneuver. For example, Asselin argues that when both Moscow and Beijing were counseling Hanoi to proceed cautiously with regard to reunification, as they did in the years immediately following the Geneva Accords, the DRV pretended "to heed the desires of its Soviet and Chinese allies" in order to "sustain" the "flow" of technical and economic support they provided (33) (34) .
This brings us to the next contribution these works offer to the scholarship on the Vietnam War. They both place the nation-building policies of Le Duan and other senior party officials into a broader international context. First, they take their cue from area studies specialists and emphasize decolonization, as much as the Cold War, as an international force shaping the actions of the North Vietnamese. 1 Both Asselin and Nguyen implicitly demonstrate that decolonization was an ongoing phenomenon that did not simply end with the independence of the colonial state from the imperial metropole. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was a newly emerging postcolonial state facing a variety of social, economic, and political challenges to its viability, including famine, war weariness, economic dislocation, population displacement, and, most importantly, geographic division into two political entities. For the leadership of the DRV, the nation that emerged from the war with the French was a truncated one that ended at the seventeenth parallel. As both Asselin and Nguyen argue, the members of the Vietnamese Politburo had very specific notions of how to overcome these challenges and realize their vision of a unified Vietnamese nation in a Cold War world, and they did not always agree. Indeed, as Asselin points out, behind the scenes of the Vietnam Workers' Party there were "sharp" Beyond these thematic similarities between the two books' contributions to the scholarship on the Vietnam conflict, there are important differences. Hanoi's Road to War takes a more focused approach to its subject matter than Hanoi's War. Asselin concentrates on the "elements informing communist revolutionary struggle and the domestic and foreign policies Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 10 (March 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-10) that strategy produced," as the Politburo gradually shifted "from a cautious approach centered on nonviolent political struggle to a risky, even reckless strategy" based on violence and "decisive" victory over the enemy (1). Nguyen offers a broader account of how that strategy played out once the die had been irrevocably cast and the DRV and United States were at war with each other. She not only considers Le Duan and his efforts to use the conflict to consolidate his hold on power-though that is a primary concern of her work-but also offers a more sweeping narrative of the war for peace on the Indochinese peninsula. She explores, for example, how and why the war spilled into Laos and Cambodia and the international ramifications of that expansion; Nixon's efforts to use the opening to China and détente with the Soviets to pressure Hanoi at the negotiating table; and Nguyen Van Thieu's attempts to tap regional and world opinion to thwart Nixon and Kissinger's efforts to betray the Saigon government with the Paris Peace Agreement.
With all scholarship there are certain limitations that one would like to see overcome and questions implicitly or explicitly raised that require further study. These books are no different. It should be noted up front that none of these critiques should detract from the significant contributions of these two important books to the literature and their accomplishments in demonstrating the best of the recent trends in studies of the Vietnam War. One of the biggest limitations to these studies, and one that is no fault of the authors, is the access to Vietnamese sources. Both Asselin and Nguyen make excellent use of the material they were able to acquire in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, but they still just scratch the surface. While the Vietnamese government has made significant strides in opening up its archives to foreign and domestic scholars, significant barriers remain. Absent from these books are the crucial accounts of the internal party debates between "North-" and "South-firsters," deliberations over policy in the Foreign and Defense Ministries, and discussions of strategy among Hanoi's military leadership.
Until significant changes regarding access to information occur within the government in Hanoi, such limitations will remain for scholars of the Vietnam War.
As for questions raised, these relate to Vietnam's position in the broader transnational story of decolonization. This phenomenon produced international forces that were arguably far more relevant to the states of the developing world than the Cold War. As we have seen, both authors demonstrate that the leadership in Hanoi, like that of many other states in the developing world, was attempting to harness these forces to advance its revolution both domestically and "the tools" they required to consolidate their hold on power in Hanoi came from "their experiences in the Mekong Delta" (19, 47) . Unfortunately, she offers very little analysis or explanation of how exactly these experiences shaped these individuals as revolutionaries or informed their abilities to consolidate their power. While this was most likely done to quickly advance the narrative to the main focus of the study-the period from the Tet Offensive to the Paris Peace Agreement-it nevertheless leaves the reader wanting more. As Nguyen herself suggests, and as so much of the literature on the Vietnam Revolution emphasizes, the oppressive nature of the French colonial apparatus, especially its penal institutions, played an important role as crucibles of the revolution, particularly for Le Duan and Le Duc Tho (see, for example , Marr 1981 and Zinoman 2001) . As their efforts to use first the revolution in the South and then the war against the Americans to establish their police state are central to the story, I would like to have seen more critical assessment of the French colonial apparatus and its penal colonies as loci of "revolutionary education" or the lessons learned in Vietnam's "Wild South" during their formative years (19, 23) .
Internationally, there is room in these works for further study of the influence of the forces unleashed by decolonization on the Vietnam conflict. It is clear from both works that Hanoi believed that the struggle below the seventeenth parallel had implications well beyond the borders of what was then South Vietnam. Asselin notes in his introduction that, as "a newly decolonized polity engaged in a national liberation struggle" in South Vietnam, the DRV "hoped to be an example of the possibilities of national liberation" to the nonaligned and Third World states (4). Nguyen contends that "Hanoi tapped into a revolutionary network of relations that managed to bridge the Global South with progressive segments of the West," and that "this is perhaps the greatest legacy of Hanoi's war" (312). Given the fact that decolonization played such an important role in the course of the American War, and given that these authors are both telling the story from the "other side," more should be done to tease out these themes. How exactly did the Politburo in Hanoi see itself as an exemplar of national liberation to the developing world?
What were the reactions of policy makers in Moscow, Beijing, and Washington to Hanoi's efforts to engage the Global South in its struggles with these powers? This in turn raises larger
